I study the effect of algorithmic trading on the strategic choice of informed traders for market versus limit orders. I proxy for this choice by means of intraday return predictability from market and limit orders around the NYSE Hybrid Market introduction. My findings show that the increase in algorithmic trading by 16% leads to an increase in informed trading through both market and limit orders at the inner levels of the limit order book by 3.5% and 6.2%, respectively. The change in the informativeness of different order types depends on the change in the competition among algorithmic traders.
The limit order book is the dominant market design in equity exchanges around the world.
1 The prevalence of limit order book markets calls for a detailed understanding of how such markets function. In particular, understanding the price discovery process on these markets required a detailed study of the trader's choice between submissions of market and limit orders. The conventional wisdom in the microstructure literature used to be that informed traders use only market orders, while uninformed traders use both market and limit orders (see Glosten and Milgrom (1985) ; Kyle (1985) ; Glosten (1994) ; Seppi (1997) ).
Only recent studies explicitly consider the choice of informed traders for market or limit orders.
2 Informed traders can submit a market order and experience immediate execution at the expense of the bid-ask spread (consume liquidity). Alternatively, informed traders can submit a limit order and thus bear the risk of non-execution, as well as the risk of being picked off, but earn the bid-ask spread (provide liquidity). In sum, understanding how informed trading takes place and how this process was altered by recent technological advances are important questions to explore in modern market microstructure. In this paper, I investigate how the increase in algorithmic trading affects the relative informativeness of different order types.
The informational advantage of algorithmic traders (and especially their subset, highfrequency traders) is based on superior technologies for information collection and processing, 1 According to Swan and Westerholm (2006) , 48% of the largest equity markets are organized as pure limit order book markets (e.g., the Australian Stock Exchange, Toronto Stock Exchange, and Tokyo Stock Exchange), 39% are organized as limit order books with designated market makers (e.g., the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Borsa Italiana), and the remaining 12% are organized as hybrid dealer markets (e.g., NASDAQ and the São Paulo Stock Exchange) as of the beginning of 2000.
2 For theoretical studies on the choice of uninformed traders between market and limit orders, see Cohen, Maier, Schwartz, and Whitcomb (1981) , Chakravarty and Holden (1995) , Handa and Schwartz (1996) , Parlour (1998 ), Foucault (1999 , Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2005) , Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan (2005) , and Roşu (2009) ; for theoretical studies on the choice of informed traders between market and limit orders, see Kaniel and Liu (2006) , Rajan (2009), and Roşu (2016) ; for empirical studies on the choice between market and limit orders on equity markets, see Bae, Jang, and Park (2003) , Anand, Chakravarty, and Martell (2005) , Bloomfield, O'Hara, and Saar (2005) , and Baruch, Panayides, and Venkataraman (2014) ; for empirical studies on the choice between market and limit orders on foreign exchange markets, see Menkhoff, Osler, and Schmeling (2010) , Kozhan and Salmon (2012) , and Kozhan, Moore, and Payne (2014) .
and also on the ability to continuously monitor and respond to market conditions. Previous research has focused mainly on informed algorithmic trading via market orders. Only Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2017) examine informed trading via both market and limit orders by a subset of algorithmic traders (high-frequency traders). They document that high-frequency traders contribute to price discovery mainly through limit orders. However, they do not establish the causal effect of high-frequency trading on the relative informativeness of different order types, which is crucial given the increasing trend of high-frequency traders' participation in modern markets.
In order to establish causal effects of algorithmic traders on the relative informativeness of order types, I follow the approach of Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) and use NYSE Hybrid Market introduction as an instrumental variable to help determine the causal effects of algorithmic trading activity on the choice made by informed traders. The introduction of the NYSE Hybrid Market was a permanent technological change in market design that resulted in increased automation and speed of trading (Hendershott and Moulton (2011) ).
The rollout of stocks to the NYSE Hybrid Market was implemented in a staggered way from October 2006 through January 2007, which allows for a causal effect identification. I proxy for algorithmic trading activity by means of the ratio of best bid-offer quote updates relative to the daily trading volume following Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) and Boehmer, Fong, and Wu (2015) , and I proxy for the relative informativeness of different order types by means of intraday return predictability using tick-by-tick consolidated trade and quote data and data on the first 10 best levels of the NYSE limit order book from the Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) database. Naturally, orders submitted by informed traders contain information about future price movements. If an informed trader actively uses market orders, an imbalance between buyerand seller-initiated volume may be informative about future price movements. If an informed trader actively uses limit orders, the limit order book may contain information that is not yet incorporated into the price. Therefore, strategies employed by informed traders may induce intraday return predictability from market and limit order flows alike.
I develop two alternative hypotheses of the effects of algorithmic trading on informed traders' choices: the competition hypothesis and the efficient technology hypothesis. Competition between algorithmic traders for (trading on) the same information makes market orders more attractive to them because they guarantee immediate execution (the competition hypothesis). The technological advantage of algorithmic traders makes limit orders more attractive to them because they are able to reduce pick-off risks better than the other market participants (the efficient technology hypothesis).
The results show that the increase in algorithmic trading activity leads to increases in the relative informativeness of market order imbalance and depth imbalance at the inner levels of the limit order book by 3.5% and 6.2% relative to the sample average, respectively.
The relative importance of the depth imbalances at the deeper levels of the limit order book decreases. The latter is in line with the anecdotal evidence that algorithmic traders tend to acquire short-lived information, and thus operate mainly at the inner levels of the limit order book.
Furthermore, I show that the relative importance of market order imbalance increases significantly only for small and mid-cap stocks by 3.4% and 5.2% relative to the sample average, while the relative importance of the limit orders at the inner levels of the limit order book increases significantly only for mid-cap and large stocks by 5.6% and 15.9% relative to sample average, respectively. The former findings are consistent with the competition hypothesis, while the latter findings are consistent with the efficient technology hypotheses.
One potential explanation for such phenomena is that large stocks are likely to be more saturated with algorithmic traders, and thus less likely to exhibit new algorithmic traders entering the market than smaller stocks are.
3 Therefore, the competition hypothesis is more profound in smaller stocks, while the efficient technology hypothesis is more profound in large stocks. Put differently, the overall effect of algorithmic traders on the choice of the order types used for informed trading depends on the change in the amount of competition between them.
My main contribution to the literature is twofold. First, I contribute to the literature on intraday return predictability by documenting that the main source of the intraday return predictability is private information embedded in limit orders for a wide cross-section of stocks. Among other papers studying intraday return predictability from limit order book and Menkveld (2015); Foucault, Hombert, and Roşu (2016); and Foucault, Kozhan, and Tham (2017) . Biais and Foucault (2014) , O'Hara (2015) , and Menkveld (2016) provide a comprehensive review of papers on high-frequency trading activity and market quality. While Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2017) show that high-frequency traders actively use limit orders for informed trading, my paper is the first one to establish a causal relation between algorithmic trading and the informativeness of different order types. 4 My evidence the degree of competition largely remains constant for top 25 Swedish stocks. 4 My paper is closely related to Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) , who also look at the causal effect of algorithmic trading on price changes related and unrelated to trading. They come to the conclusion that large stocks exhibit an increase in price discovery not related to trading activity. However, they document a confounded effect of inventory costs and information incorporated in the quotes, and additionally focus only on the best bid-offer level, thus not taking into account information embedded in deeper levels of shows that an increased degree of algorithmic trading activity leads to an increased usage of both informed market and informed limit orders at the inner levels of the limit order book accompanied by a decreased usage of informed limit orders at the deeper levels of the limit order book. The ultimate effect of algorithmic trading activity on the way price discovery takes place depends on the competition among them.
The paper is structured as follows. Section I develops the hypotheses. Section II discusses the data and methodology used in the paper. Section III provides the main empirical results.
Section IV contains additional analysis. Section V concludes.
I. Hypotheses
In this section, I develop the hypotheses for the effects of algorithmic trading on the choice between limit and market orders by informed traders. Under the traditional view (see, e.g., Glosten and Milgrom (1985) ; Kyle (1985) ; Glosten (1994); and Seppi (1997) ), only market orders are used for informed trading, which may be an inadequate approximation of reality. Later studies build upon this initial work and allow both informed and uninformed traders to choose between the order types (Kaniel and Liu (2006) ; Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan (2009); Roşu (2016) ).
Based on theoretical predictions from Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan (2009) , an informed trader who receives good news about a stock has three different options to exploit this information. First, the trader can submit a buy market order and consume liquidity. Second, the trader can submit a limit buy order at the inner levels of the bid side of the limit order book (this limits execution probability, but saves transaction costs). Third, the trader can also submit a limit sell order at the outer levels of the ask side of the limit order book, in combination with one of the two other order options, to lock in the benefit from the price difference. The opposite is true for the bad-news scenario.
the limit order book.
During the past decade, a new group of market participants -algorithmic traders -has emerged and evolved into a dominant player responsible for the majority of trading volume.
Algorithmic trading "is thought to be responsible for as much as 73% of trading volume in the United States in 2009" (Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) , p. 1). Therefore, it is natural to ask what role algorithmic traders are playing in the price discovery process and to what extent their presence affects the informed trader's choice between market and limit orders.
Possessing private information is equivalent to having the capacity to absorb and analyze publicly available information (including information from the past order flow) faster than other market participants (Foucault, Hombert, and Roşu (2016) ; Foucault, Kozhan, and Tham (2017) ; Menkveld and Zoican (2017) ). Efficient information-processing technology is a distinct feature of algorithmic traders, hence they are more likely to be informed than other market participants. However, ex ante, it is not clear whether algorithmic traders would prefer to use market or limit orders to profit from their informational advantage.
On the one hand, competition among informed traders will lead to a faster price discovery and a shorter lifespan for the information obtained by the informed trader. Algorithmic traders compete for the same information by processing the same news releases or by analyzing past order flow patterns as fast as possible. In a competitive market, a trader must be the first in line to trade on information in order to profit from it. Given that only market orders can guarantee immediate execution, algorithmic traders may be inclined to use market orders for informed trading.
On the other hand, limit orders are attractive for traders who can accurately predict execution probabilities, continuously monitor the market, and quickly adapt to market conditions. Algorithmic traders possess all of these characteristics. Thus, they may be inclined to use limit orders for informed trading.
Therefore, I formulate two alternative hypotheses for the effect of increase in algorithmic trading on the informed traders' choice between market and limit orders. 
A. Data and variables
I obtain the data for the period from June 2006 till May 2007. I obtain intraday data on trades and best bid-offer quotes as well as the 10 best levels of the limit order book for the U.S. market from the TRTH database. The TRTH database is provided by the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). The limit order book data provided by TRTH does not include order-level information (e.g., it contains no order submission, revision, or cancellation details), only the 10 best price levels and the depth on bid and ask sides of the book that are visible to the public. The data for limit order book comes from the NYSE. The data for trades and best bid-offer quotes comes from the consolidated tape.
In other words, the best bid-offer reported in the data is the best bid-offer for any exchange in the U.S. TRTH data are organized by Reuters Instrumental Codes (RICs), which are identical to TICKERs provided by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Merging data from CRSP and TRTH allows me to identify common shares that indicate the NYSE as their primary exchange and to use company-specific information (e.g., market capitalization and turnover). This study is limited to NYSE-listed stocks only due to the limit order book data availability. I require all stocks to be present in CRSP database for the whole sample period. I discard stocks with an average monthly price bigger than $1,000 and smaller than $5. I winsorize all the variables at the 95% level (2.5% at the each tail of the distribution).
For the purpose of further analysis, I aggregate intraday data from TRTH in the following way. I compute one-minute mid-quote returns and market order imbalances, and take snapshots of the limit order book at the end of each one-minute interval. I filter the intraday data following Rösch, Subrahmanyam, and Van Dijk (2016) . First, I discard trades, quotes, and limit order book data that are not part of the continuous trading session. Continuous trading session hours for NYSE are 9:30-16:00 ET and they remain unchanged during the sample period. Second, I discard block trades (i.e., trades with a trade size greater than 10,000 shares) because these trades are likely to receive special treatment. Third, I discard data entries that are likely to be faulty. Faulty entries include entries with negative or zero prices or quotes; entries with a negative bid-ask spread; entries with a proportional bid-ask spread bigger than 25%; and entries that have a trade price, bid price, or ask price that deviates from the 10 surrounding ticks by more than 10%. In addition, I require that at least five levels of the limit order book are available in the end of each one-minute interval. 
A.1. Proxy for algorithmic trading
My data does not allow me to identify algorithmic traders directly. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that algorithmic traders tend to send multiple messages per each individual transaction. Therefore, I consider the following two proxies for algorithmic trading activity in the spirit of Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) and Boehmer, Fong, and Wu (2015) :
QT E/DV OL, a daily number of best bid-offer quote updates relative to daily trading volume (in $10,000) and QT E/T RD, a daily number of best bid-offer quote updates relative to the daily number of transactions. I use the QT E/DV OL in a baseline analysis, while QT E/T RD is used for robustness check.
A.2. Proxy for order-type informativeness
I use intraday predictive regressions to proxy for the informational content of different order types. I construct intraday data on returns, market order imbalances (M OIB) 5 , and limit order book imbalances at a one-minute frequency. For all the variables, I discard overnight observations. I use these variables to predict returns one minute ahead.
I follow Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2008) and compute one-minute log returns (Ret) based on the prevailing mid-quotes (the average of the bid and ask prices) at the end of the one-minute interval, rather than the transaction prices or mid-quotes matched with the last transaction price. In this way, I avoid the bid-ask bounce and ensure that the returns for every stock are indeed computed over a one-minute interval. I implicitly assume that there are no stale best bid-offer quotes in the sample, and thus I consider a quote to be valid until a new quote arrives or until a new trading day starts.
To calculate a one-minute M OIB, I match trades with quotes and sign trades using the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. TRTH data are stamped to the millisecond, therefore the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm is quite accurate. In particular, a trade is considered to be buyer initiated (seller initiated) if it is closer to the ask price (bid price) of the prevailing quote. For each one-minute interval, I aggregate the trading volume in USD for buyer-and seller-initiated trades separately at the stock level. Thereafter, I subtract seller-initiated dollar volume from buyer-initiated dollar volume to obtain M OIB and normalize it by the 5 Market order imbalance is based on both market and marketable limit orders.
total trading volume. For stock i on date d at one-minute interval t,
There are multiple ways to describe the limit order book. Most of the papers that study intraday return predictability either focus on different levels of the limit order book or on the corresponding ratios of these levels between the ask and bid sides of the limit order book.
For instance, Wuyts (2008), Cao, Hansch, and Wang (2009) , and Cenesizoglu, Dionne, and Zhou (2014) use slopes and depth at different levels of the limit order book to summarize its shape. However, due to variation in the shape of the limit order book as well as in the number of available levels of the limit order book, I believe that definition of inner, middle, and outer levels by means of a relative threshold is more suitable than definition by means of the number of levels in the limit order book (e.g., levels from 1 to 3 are inner levels, levels from 4 to 6 are middle levels, and levels from 7 to 10 are outer levels).
Examples of a relative approach to limit order book description are Cao, Hansch, and
Wang (2009), who also use volume-weighted average price for different order sizes to describe the limit order book, and Kavajecz and Odders-White (2004) , who use a so-called "neardepth" measure, which is a proportion of the depth close to the best bid-offer level relative to the cumulative depth within a certain price range.
For the purpose of testing the private information hypothesis, I focus on the ratios of depth concentrated at inner, middle, and outer levels of the limit order book between the ask and bid sides. I use a modification of the "near-depth" measure introduced by Kavajecz and Odders-White (2004) . First, I compute a snapshot of the ask and bid sides of the limit order book at the end of each one-minute interval. Then, I define the inner levels as price levels between the mid-quote and one-third of the minimum across bid and ask sides of the total distance between the 10th available limit price and the mid-quote. Outer levels are defined as price levels above two-thirds of the minimum across bid and ask sides of the total distance between the 10th available limit price and the mid-quote. I refer to the remaining levels as middle levels of the limit order book. For stock i on date d at one-minute interval t,
My relative approach allows me to define in a unified fashion the levels that are close to the best bid-offer level, as well as the levels that are far away from the best bid-offer level across stocks and through time.
In order to estimate order-type informativeness, I run stock-day predictive regressions at a one-minute frequency using one-minute mid-quote returns as the dependent variable.
As explanatory variables, I use lagged returns, lagged market order imbalance (M OIB), and lagged depth imbalances at the inner, middle, and outer levels of the limit order book.
Controlling for lagged returns allows me to differentiate between temporary effect (inventory management) and permanent effect (private information). The regression equation for each stock i on day d is given by:
For each stock-day I proxy for order-type informativeness by contribution of the each variable to the R 2 of the predictive regressions averaged across all possible orderings of the variables as in Lindeman, Merenda, and Gold (1980) .
B. Instrumental variable approach
The main contribution of this study is the identification of causal effects of algorithmic trading on the relative informativeness of different order types. Identifying the causal effects of the algorithmic trading activity is not a trivial task, as the degree of algorithmic trading activity in each stock on each day is an endogenous choice made by the algorithmic trader. (2011)). 6 Among other changes, after the NYSE Hybrid Market's introduction, orders were allowed to "walk" through the limit order book automatically; before this technological change, market orders were executed automatically at the best bid-offer level only. I obtain data on the NYSE Hybrid Market's rollout, which was when the actual increase in the degree of automated execution and speed took place, from Terrence Hendershott's website. This rollout was implemented in a staggered way from October 2006 through January 2007 (see Figure 1) , which allows for a causal effect identification.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE I follow Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) and estimate the following IV panel regression with stock and day fixed effects (implicit difference-in-difference approach) and with standard errors clustered by stock:
where Y i,d is the contribution of each variable to the R 2 of predictive regressions (see equation A. Algorithmic trading activity I present the average proxies for algorithmic trading activity (averaged across stock-days)
in Table I Table II presents the estimation results of the predictive stock-day regressions of oneminute mid-quote returns on one-minute lagged mid-quote returns, one-minute lagged mar-ket order imbalances, and one-minute lagged depth imbalances at the inner, middle, and outer levels of the limit order book (see equation (6)) for the whole sample and market capitalization terciles. Controlling for lagged returns allows me to separate inventory effects from the effects of private information, as information should result in a permanent price change. I discuss the whole sample results only as the results for different market capitalization terciles are in line with the results of the whole sample.
INSERT Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2005, 2008) ). In particular, the M OIB coefficient is 0.596 and is positive and significant in 27.3% of the stock-day regressions.
7 Depth imbalances at the inner and middle levels of the limit order book are positively and significantly related to the future price movements in 46.5% and 12.7%, respectively, while depth imbalances at the outer levels of the limit order book have, on average, negative effects; however, the proportion of positive and negative significant stock days is almost the same. The latter could be due to the fact that outer levels are used for informed trading if and only if an informed trader receives a relatively strong signal, which is unlikely to happen regularly on the market.
In order to measure the relative importance of different order types, I look at the R 2 decomposition of the predictive regressions averaged across all possible orderings of the variables as in Lindeman, Merenda, and Gold (1980) . Panel B of Table II shows that the average adjusted R 2 of the predictive regressions is equal to 2.5% for the whole sample.
M OIB contributes 19.4% to the R 2 (0.49% in absolute terms), while limit order book imbalances, LOIB, jointly account for 57.6% of the R 2 (1.44% in absolute terms). The largest predictive power comes from depth imbalances at the inner levels of the limit order book (30.9% in relative terms). As a comparison, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2008) document an adjusted R 2 of 0.51% for predictive regressions using only lagged dollar market order imbalance as predictive variable for the 1993-2002 period.
My results are consistent with Cao, Hansch, and Wang (2009), who document an increase in adjusted R 2 after inclusion of additional levels of the limit order book with a monotonic decrease of the added value for each additional level. My results are, however, at odds with Cont, Kukanov, and Stoikov (2014), who argue that only imbalances at the BBO level drive intraday return predictability.
All in all, this suggests that private information is the main source of the intraday return predictability: roughly 20% of this predictability is attributable to the informed market orders, and roughly 60% is attributable to the informed limit orders. The remaining 20%
stem from inventory-management concerns (lagged returns).
C. The effect of algorithmic trading on order-type informativeness
In this section, I discuss the casual effect of algorithmic trading on the relative informativeness of different order types. Table III reports the results of the first-stage instrumental variable regression (see equation (7)), with the NYSE Hybrid Market's introduction as an instrument for algorithmic trading activity.
INSERT TABLE III HERE
I document that algorithmic trading activity, as proxied by the number of best bidoffer quote updates relative to daily trading volume in USD 10,000 (QT E/DV OL) increases significantly for the whole sample as well as for different market capitalization terciles. In particular, algorithmic trading increases by 1.01 best bid-offer quote update per USD 10,000
trading volume or 16% relative to its average value for the whole sample period.
Interestingly, I observe a monotonic decrease in the changes of algorithmic trading due to the NYSE Hybrid Market's introduction, moving from small to large stocks. However, the relative effect exhibits the opposite pattern: from a 14% increase for small stocks to a 25% increase for large stocks.
INSERT TABLE IV HERE
The results for the second-stage regression for the whole sample are presented in Table   IV . In particular, I estimate the effect of algorithmic trading on the R 2 decomposition from predictive regressions (see equation (6)). 8 Algorithmic trading increases price informativeness as manifested by an increase of adjusted R 2 by 0.31% -or, in relative terms, by 12.4%
(0.31%/2.5%). Algorithmic trading activity increases the relative importance of both market orders and limit orders at the inner levels of the limit order book by 0.68% and 1.92%, or by 3.51% and by 6.21%, relative to the sample mean, respectively. This implies that on average, adjusted R 2 attributable to market order imbalances increases from 0.49% to 0.56% and adjusted R 2 attributable to the depth imbalances at the inner levels of the limit order book increases from 0.77% to 0.92%. Depth imbalances at the middle and outer levels of the limit order book decrease their relative importance. This finding is in line with the fact that algorithmic trading operates with short-lived information extracted from the order flow, and thus traders will not be inclined to use the middle and outer levels of the limit order book in their trading strategies due to the long elapsed time between order submission and execution. Overall, there is a shift of relative importance to both market orders and limit orders at the inner levels of the limit order book, which is consistent with both the competition and efficient technology hypotheses.
Among others, Hagströmer and Norden (2013) and Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2014) provide empirical evidence that algorithmic traders (especially high-frequency traders)
8 I use the relative decomposition of the R 2 rather than the absolute one because I want to isolate the change of different order types' relative informativeness from the general effect of the changes in R 2 due to the increase in algorithmic trading activity.
are more present in large stocks than in small stocks. Therefore, the effects of increase in algorithmic trading activity might be different for stocks with different market capitalization. Table V presents the second-stage results for different market capitalization terciles. In line with the competition hypothesis, I document that the relative importance of market order imbalances increases significantly for small and medium-size stocks by 0.64% and 0.96%, or by 3.35% and 5.22%, relative to sample average, respectively, but not for the large stocks. A possible explanation for medium-size stocks having a larger increase in importance of market orders for the price discovery process than small stocks is that small stocks have the largest spread, which makes it more costly to use market orders in the first place. At the same time, the relative importance of inner levels increases significantly with algorithmic trading for medium and large stocks by 1.86% and 4.29%, or by 5.63% and 15.89%, relative to sample average, respectively, but not for the small stocks. Put differently, the competition hypothesis manifests itself more in small stocks, while the efficient technology hypothesis manifests itself more in large stocks. This is consistent with strong entry barriers within high-frequency traders' business (see Baron, Brogaard, Hagströmer, and Kirilenko (2017) ), which lead to a larger increase in competition between high-frequency traders in stocks with ex-ante low presence of high-frequency traders.
INSERT TABLE V HERE
To sum up, I contribute to the debate on whether algorithmic traders adversely select other market participants. I provide evidence that the increased participation of algorithmic traders has caused an increase in the relative importance of the price discovery process for both market orders and limit orders concentrated at the inner levels of the limit order book.
Moreover, in large stocks, which were likely to have a lot of algorithmic trading activity before the introduction of the NYSE Hybrid Market, prices become more informative purely via limit orders. This suggests that, in the absence of new algorithmic traders entering the market, any increase in algorithmic trading activity will lead to an increase of the informed liquidity provision.
IV. Additional analysis
In this section, I provide additional results to support the baseline analysis discussed in the Section III.C. I show that my results are robust to using another proxy of algorithmic trading activity (Section IV.A) and also conduct a placebo test (Section IV.B). I provide additional support to the competition versus efficient technology hypotheses by looking at the NYSE Hybrid Market's rollout sequence (Section IV.C). In Section IV.D, I confirm that algorithmic traders are focused on short-lived information.
A. Another proxy for algorithmic trading
In this section, instead of using QT E/DV OL, the daily number of best bid-offer quote updates relative to daily trading volume (in $10,000), as a proxy of algorithmic trading, I use QT E/T RD, the daily number of best bid-offer quote updates relative to the daily number of transactions. I note that this proxy of algorithmic trading activity is inferior to the one used in the baseline analysis because it does not take into account the size of each individual transaction.
INSERT TABLE VI HERE
The results for the second-stage of the instrumental variable regression (see equation (7)) for the whole sample are presented in Table VI . Overall, the results are consistent with my findings in the baseline analysis. However, the shift in the relative importance of different order types for the price discovery process is more profound. Algorithmic trading activity increases the relative importance of both market orders and limit orders at the inner levels of the limit order book by 2.36% and 6.70%, respectively (as opposed to the baseline case: 0.68% and 1.98%, respectively). Depth imbalances at the middle and outer levels of the limit order book decrease their importance for the price discovery process.
B. Placebo test
In order to ensure that my results are indeed driven by the NYSE Hybrid Market's rollout, which resulted in increased algorithmic trading activity, I perform a placebo test. In particular, for each stock, I randomly pick an NYSE Hybrid Market rollout date from a pool of all rollout dates observed in my sample, excluding the actual rollout date for this stock.
Afterwards, I re-estimate second-stage of the instrumental variable regression (see equation (7)) with randomly assigned rollout dates. I repeat this exercise 1,000 times and report the average coefficient in front of algorithmic trading from the second-stage regression and also the proportion of cases in which this variable was statistically significant at the 10%, 5%,and 1% levels.
INSERT TABLE VII HERE
The results for the placebo test are presented in Table VII . Remarkably, the proportion of cases with a statistically significant effect of algorithmic trading is always well below the significance level. To sum up, I confirm that my results indeed have a causal interpretation rather than the common-trends explanation.
C. Rollout sequence
New algorithmic traders would require some time in order to set up their systems for algorithmic trading (e.g., colocate their servers and develop software). I expect that such traders will not appear in the stocks that were rolled out to the NYSE Hybrid Market first, but rather in the stocks that were rolled out later. New algorithmic traders are likely to rely more heavily on using market orders in their trading strategies because it requires less experience and less expensive connections to exchange than engaging in market-making business (i.e., an active usage of limit orders) -for example, Brogaard, Hagströmer, Norden, and Riordan (2015) document that mainly high-frequency market makers undertake the colocation upgrade offered by NASDAQ OMX Stockholm voluntarily. Besides that, entry of the new algorithmic traders to the market increases competition for the same information, which in turn leads to increased attractiveness of market orders for informed trading (the competition hypothesis).
INSERT TABLE VIII HERE
The results for the second-stage of the instrumental variable regression (see equation (7)) split by the rollout sequence to the NYSE Hybrid Market are presented in Table VIII . I show that stocks that were rolled out first experience an increase in the relative importance of the depth imbalances at the inner levels of the limit order book, but not stocks that were rolled out later, while the opposite is true for market order imbalances. All in all, my findings are consistent with the fact that new algorithmic traders are likely to rely on trading strategies involving market orders and with the fact that increased competition among algorithmic traders leads to increased relative informativeness of market orders.
D. Lifespan of information
Anecdotal evidence suggests that algorithmic traders rely on short-lived information.
Therefore, I expect that the effects of algorithmic trading on the relative importance of different order types deteriorates with an increase in the predictive horizon (i.e., the lifespan of the information).
INSERT TABLE IX HERE
I start by providing summary statistics for the relative importance of different order types for the price discovery process for different predictive horizons: one minute (baseline analysis), two minutes, and three minutes (see Table IX ). Panel A of Table IX presents the average coefficients of the predictive regressions (see equation (6)) together with the proportion of stock-days when they were significantly different from zero. Interestingly, I
observe that inventory effects become stronger when I increase the predictive horizon from one minute to three minutes. In particular, the size of the coefficient in front of lagged returns increases monotonically, as does the proportion of stock-days when this coefficient is negative and significant. Table IX presents R 2 decomposition averaged across all possible orderings of the variables as in Lindeman, Merenda, and Gold (1980) . I confirm that the importance of inventory effects increases while moving from a one-minute horizon to a three-minute horizon:
Panel B of
from 22% to 25% of the overall predictive power. If information has a longer lifespan, an informed trader does not mind waiting longer (conditional on getting a better price), and therefore an informed trader is likely to submit limit orders deep in the limit order book if her information lives long enough. In line with this consideration, the importance of market order imbalances and depth imbalances at the inner levels of the limit order book decreases from 19.4% to 16.2% and from 30.9% to 23.1%, respectively, while increasing the predictive horizon. At the same time, the importance of depth imbalances at the middle and outer levels of the limit order book increases from 13.6% to 17.6% and from 13.2% to 17.2%, respectively, while increasing the predictive horizon.
INSERT TABLE X HERE Table X presents the results of the second-stage regressions for the different predictive horizons. I observe that algorithmic traders become more concerned about their inventory with an increase in the horizon: the relative importance of the lagged returns in predicting future price movements increases significantly by 1.43% and 1.14% for the two-minute and three-minute horizons, respectively. The importance of market order imbalances either does not change or decreases with increase in algorithmic trading activity for the two-minute and three-minutes horizons, respectively. The importance of depth imbalances at the inner levels of the limit order book increases with an increase in algorithmic trading activity by 0.59% and 0.66% for the two-minute and three-minute horizons, respectively. However, this increase is almost three times smaller than the increase observed for the one-minute horizon (1.92%). If algorithmic traders also collect long-lived information, one can expect that the relative informativeness of the depth imbalances at the middle and outer levels of the limit order book will increase with the increasing horizon. However, the relative informativeness of depth imbalances at the middle and outer levels of the limit order book decreases as well, suggesting that algorithmic traders are not acquiring long-lived information.
Overall, my findings suggest that market orders and orders at the inner levels of the limit order book are used for short-lived information, while orders deep in the limit order book are used for long-lived information. Besides that, algorithmic traders are focused on short-lived information only.
V. Conclusion
The recent public debates regarding algorithmic traders (and high-frequency traders) adversely selecting retail investors highlighted the importance of understanding how informed trading is taking place and how it was affected by the emergence of algorithmic trading.
Motivated by this, I investigate the intraday return predictability from informed market limit orders around introduction to the NYSE Hybrid Market -a change in market design that I use as an instrumental variable for algorithmic trading activity.
To the best of my knowledge, I am the first to establish a causal relation between algorithmic trading activity and the relative informativeness of different order types. In line with the previous literature, I confirm that both limit and market orders are actively used for informed trading. I show that an increase in algorithmic trading activity leads to a shift of relative informativeness from the limit orders deep in the limit order book to the limit orders at the inner levels of the limit order book and market orders. The net effect of algorithmic trading depends on the change in competition between them.
One important implication of my analysis concerns measures of asymmetric information and/or informed trading (e.g., the PIN measure by Easley, Kiefer, and O'Hara (1996) and the adverse selection component of bid-ask spread by Glosten and Harris (1988) and Huang and Stoll (1997) ), which have been used widely in studies on market microstructure, asset pricing, and corporate finance. 9 These measures are exclusively based on market orders, and thus neglect the lion's share of informed trading on the equity markets -informed trading via limit orders.
In conclusion, in the market where new algorithmic traders are not likely to enter, any increase of algorithmic trading should lead to more informed liquidity provision, keeping constant informed liquidity demand. This fact should not be neglected while analyzing the adverse selection effects on financial markets as well as regulatory actions targeted at the important subset of algorithmic traders known as high-frequency traders.
9 E.g., Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara (2002) , Vega (2006), Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2006) , Korajczyk and Sadka (2008 ), Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu (2008 ), and Easley, de Prado, and O'Hara (2012 . This table provides the results of the second-stage regression with the R 2 decomposition as dependent variables and with the rollout to the NYSE Hybrid Market used as an instrument (see equation (7)) for the 944 NYSE-listed common stocks in my sample from June 2006 to May 2007. Algorithmic trading activity is proxied by number of best bid-offer quote updates relative to trading volume in USD 10,000 (QT E/DV OL). All regressions include stock and day fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by stock. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The data on trades, best bid-offer quotes, and NYSE limit order book snapshots comes from TRTH. The data on control variables comes from CRSP. Data on NYSE Hybrid Market introduction comes from Terrence Hendershott's website. All variables are 95% winsorized. This table provides the results of the second-stage regression with the R 2 decomposition as dependent variables and with the rollout to the NYSE Hybrid Market used as an instrument (see equation (7)) for the 944 NYSE-listed common stocks in my sample from June 2006 to May 2007. Algorithmic trading activity is proxied by the number of best bid-offer quote updates relative to trading volume in USD 10,000 (QT E/DV OL). For brevity, I report only the coefficients in front of the algorithmic trading proxy for three terciles based on market capitalization as of the beginning of June 2006. All regressions include stock and day fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by stock. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The data on trades, best bid-offer quotes, and NYSE limit order book snapshots comes from TRTH. The data on control variables comes from CRSP. Data on NYSE Hybrid Market introduction comes from Terrence Hendershott's website. All variables are 95% winsorized. This table provides the results of the second-stage regression with the R 2 decomposition as dependent variables and with the rollout to the NYSE Hybrid Market used as an instrument (see equation (7)) for the 944 NYSE-listed common stocks in my sample from June 2006 to May 2007. Algorithmic trading activity is proxied by the number of best bid-offer quote updates relative to number of transactions (QT E/T RD). All regressions include stock and day fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by stock. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The data on trades, best bid-offer quotes, and NYSE limit order book snapshots comes from TRTH. The data on control variables comes from CRSP. Data on NYSE Hybrid Market introduction comes from Terrence Hendershott's website. All variables are 95% winsorized. This table provides the results of the second-stage regression with the R 2 decomposition as dependent variables for 1,000 repetitions of the random assignment of rollout to the NYSE Hybrid Market used as an instrument (see equation (7)) for the 944 NYSE-listed common stocks in our sample from June 2006 to May 2007. In particular, this table reports the average coefficient in front of the proxy for algorithmic trading activity, and the proportion of significant cases at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Algorithmic trading activity is proxied by the number of best bid-offer quote updates relative to trading volume in USD 10,000 (QT E/DV OL). All regressions include stock and day fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by stock. The data on trades, best bid-offer quotes, and NYSE limit order book snapshots comes from TRTH. The data on control variables comes from CRSP. Data on NYSE Hybrid Market introduction comes from Terrence Hendershott's website. All variables are 95% winsorized. This table provides the results of the second-stage regression with the R 2 decomposition as dependent variables and with the rollout to the NYSE Hybrid Market used as an instrument (see equation (7)) for the 944 NYSE-listed common stocks in my sample from June 2006 to May 2007. Algorithmic trading activity is proxied by the number of best bid-offer quote updates relative to trading volume in USD 10,000 (QT E/DV OL). For brevity, I report only the coefficients in front of the algorithmic trading proxy for three terciles based on the rollout sequence to the NYSE Hybrid Market. All regressions include stock and day fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by stock. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The data on trades, best bid-offer quotes, and NYSE limit order book snapshots comes from TRTH. The data on control variables comes from CRSP. Data on NYSE Hybrid market introduction comes from Terrence Hendershott's website. All variables are 95% winsorized.
Adjusted R 2 (6)) for the 944 NYSE-listed common stocks in my sample from June 2006 to May 2007. This period covers the rollout to The NYSE Hybrid Market used as an instrument in the instrumental variable analysis. Panel A reports average coefficient estimates across stock-days and the proportion of the stock-days on which coefficients were significantly different from zero at a 10% significance level separately for positive and negative coefficients. Panel B reports the results of the R 2 decomposition (average across all possible orderings). The results are reported for one-minute, two-minute, and three-minute horizons, respectively. The data on trades, best bid-offer quotes, and NYSE limit order book snapshots comes from TRTH. All variables are 95% winsorized.
Table X Second stage regression for different horizons
This table provides the results of the second-stage regression with the R 2 decomposition as dependent variables and with the rollout to the NYSE Hybrid Market used as an instrument (see equation (7)) for the 944 NYSE-listed common stocks in my sample from June 2006 to May 2007. Algorithmic trading activity is proxied by the number of best bid-offer quote updates relative to trading volume in USD 10,000 (QT E/DV OL). For brevity, I report only the coefficients in front of the algorithmic trading proxy for one-minute, two-minute, and three-minute horizons, respectively. All regressions include stock and day fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by stock. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The data on trades, best bid-offer quotes, and NYSE limit order book snapshots comes from TRTH. The data on control variables comes from CRSP. Data on NYSE Hybrid Market introduction comes from Terrence Hendershott's website. All variables are 95% winsorized. 
